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Fed funds futures show that the market is currently pricing that the Fed funds rate over the next five years will bottom at 4% and then slowly start to rise again, see chart below.
In other words, the market is pricing that monetary policy will remain restrictive and above r-star (2.5%) for the next five years. Put differently, the market is currently pricing a “no landing” scenario where monetary policy will have to put downward pressure on GDP growth and inflation for the next five years. In short, the market is extremely bullish on the economic outlook over the next five years.
A different way to look at current Fed pricing is to compare Fed funds futures to the longer-run dot in the Fed’s dot plot, which shows that the FOMC expects the Fed funds rate in the longer run to be 2.5%.
The bottom line is that the FOMC and Fed estimates of r-star are saying that the Fed funds rate will move down to 2.5%. But the market disagrees and says that rates will stay around 4% for the next five years, see again the chart below.
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The divergence between the S&P7 and the S&P493 continues, see the first chart below. Investors buying the S&P500 today are buying seven companies that are already up 80% this year and have an average P/E ratio above 50. In fact, S&P7 valuations are beginning to look similar to the Nifty Fifty and the tech bubble in March 2000, see the second chart below.
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The New York Fed’s latest household survey shows that a record-high share of consumers are saying that it is much harder to obtain credit, see chart below.
This is what the textbook would have predicted. When the Fed raises interest rates, it becomes more difficult for consumers to borrow.
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Moody’s data for October shows that default rates continue to increase, see the first chart below.
This is not surprising. Default rates will continue to trend higher. Why? Because the rise in default rates is engineered by the Fed. The Fed is in the process of slowing down the economy with the goal of getting inflation back to the FOMC’s 2% target.
In other words, the ongoing rise in default rates is not just a “normalization.” It is the direct consequence of Fed hikes. The Fed is trying to slow the economy down.
Total employment of companies in the high yield index is 11 million, and total employment of companies in the leveraged loans index is 8 million, see the second chart below.
With interest rates staying high at least until mid-2024, the downside risks to employment continue to be meaningful because the goal of the Fed is to soften the labor market and lower inflation. And the only tool they have is to keep interest rates high until they get what they want, namely inflation back at 2%.
Our latest credit market outlook is available here. Investors should be up in quality and stay away from small-cap highly leveraged companies with low coverage ratios and weak cash flows because those companies will be particularly vulnerable to high costs of capital and slowing earnings growth.
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During the pandemic, many households refinanced their mortgages at lower interest rates. As a result, 22% of mortgages today have an interest rate below 3%, up from 1% of all mortgages in 2019, see chart below.
The locking in of lower mortgage rates has weakened the transmission mechanism of monetary policy, and it is the reason why Fed hikes have not had a more significant negative impact on the housing market.
The bottom line is that Fed hikes are not having the desired effect because households have locked in low levels of mortgage rates during the pandemic. As a result, the Fed will have to keep interest rates higher for longer to slow down the economy and get inflation back to 2%.
Our latest housing outlook is available here.
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The United Nations forecasts that by the end of this century, Japan’s population will have declined from 120 million to 80 million, see chart below.
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The unemployment rate for 16- to 19-year-olds has increased from 9.2% in April to 13.2% in October, see chart below.
We are monitoring closely if the sharp decline in demand for young workers is a leading indicator of broader labor market weakness.
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Eight months after the SVB collapse, large banks continue to enjoy significantly lower funding costs and, hence, higher profit margins than regional banks, see the first chart below.
With ongoing headwinds from CRE holdings, the held-to-maturity book, and regulatory uncertainty, it is going to take some time for regional banks to repair their balance sheets.
This continues to be a macro problem, because banks No. 5 to No. 4,000 by assets make up 60% of all assets in the banking sector, see also the second chart showing the ongoing sharp slowdown in bank lending.
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The Fed cannot begin to send dovish signals when inflation expectations jump higher the way they have done recently, see chart below.
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There is a lot of discussion in markets about the implications of the US fiscal situation.
Three areas to watch for investors are 1) debt ceiling and shutdown risk, 2) Treasury auctions, and 3) US downgrade risk. The complication for markets is that the debt ceiling and shutdown come and go with months between, but Treasury auctions happen every week, and a notice from a rating agency about the US fiscal situation can come with no warning.
In other words, for investors, the fiscal situation is not like watching quarterly earnings but instead a topic constantly lingering in the background that can impact markets with little or no warning—if, for example, a Treasury auction tails or rating agencies issue a statement.
The fundamental question remains: Who is going to buy the growing supply of Treasuries, and at what price?
Looking at net foreign purchases of Treasuries shows that foreign official institutions, i.e., central banks and sovereign wealth funds, have been net sellers of Treasuries since 2015, see chart below.
Foreign private buyers, on the other hand, stepped up purchases when the Fed raised interest rates in 2022. But in 2023 with rates peaking, they have been slowing their purchases, see again the chart below.
The bottom line is that investors across all asset classes need to spend some time not only on who is buying Treasuries—including whether it is yield-sensitive or yield-insensitive buyers—but also on Treasury auction metrics and what the rating agencies are saying and doing.
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